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                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
     
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 10-4229 
______ 
 
JOHN BLANK, 
                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY FOR THE  
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS;  
HOWARD NELSON, in his official and  
individual capacity; GEORGE BENGAL, in  
his official and individual capacity; ASHLEY  
MUTCH, in her official and individual capacity;  
JUAN MARTINEZ, in his official and individual  
capacity; MAIN LINE ANIMAL RESCUE, INC;  
WILLIAM SMITH 
______ 
         
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-03222) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle III 
______ 
        
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2011 
 
Before: BARRY, AMBRO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 28, 2011) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
I. 
 John Blank appeals from the District Court’s order granting the Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss his federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and accompanying state law 
claims.  Blank argues that the District Court erred in concluding that: (1) his federal 
claims against the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and 
several of its employees were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and (2) 
Main Line Animal Rescue (“MLAR”) and its CEO and president William Smith were not 
acting under the color of state law.  We will affirm.  
II.
1
 
 We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and 
procedural history of this case, which is set forth in the District Court’s opinion.  See 
Blank v. Pa. Soc’y for the Prev. of Cruelty to Anim., et al., No. 2:10-cv-03222, 2010 WL 
3927590, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2010).  We have little to add to the District Court’s 
reasoning, as explained in Judge Bartle’s opinion, for granting the motion to dismiss as to 
the same issues raised on appeal.  Thus we will limit our discussion to one aspect of the 
District Court’s opinion and otherwise affirm for substantially the same reasons 
expressed therein.  
                                              
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction over Blank’s § 1983 action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3)-(4), and 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
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 Although we agree with the District Court that Blank’s federal claims constitute an 
impermissible collateral attack on his convictions, see Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, we part 
ways with the District Court on one particular point.  The District Court concluded that 
the “Commonwealth’s entire case hinged on the evidence of animal cruelty obtained 
through the July 17, 2008 raid.”  Blank, 2010 WL 3927590, at *3.  Because several 
Defendants visited Blank’s kennel prior to the July 17, 2008 raid and witnessed poor 
living conditions and animal injuries, we cannot say with confidence that his convictions 
were based exclusively on evidence obtained from the purportedly illegal search and 
seizure that took place on July 17, 2008.   
Nonetheless, we think Blank’s federal claims are barred by Heck because they are 
premised on the theory that this additional evidence was “concoct[ed],” “distorted,” and 
“misrepresented” as part of a broad conspiracy to conduct an illegal search and seizure 
and deprive Blank of his constitutional rights.  (App. at 28-30.)  Elsewhere in his 
complaint, Blank contends that the conduct of several Defendants resulted in “the 
continued filing and prosecution of charges and cases that should never have been filed 
and prosecuted.”  (Id. at 42.)  In sum, Blank’s federal claims are contingent on the 
proposition that genuine evidence of the crimes to which he pled guilty did not exist and 
that no investigation or charges would have been brought against him but for a deliberate 
conspiracy carried out by the Defendants.  Accordingly, Blank’s claims are irreconcilable 
with his guilty plea, and if successful, they would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 
convictions.  See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.  Thus, while we differ with the District Court 
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regarding the significance of the July 17, 2008 raid, we agree with the District Court’s 
ultimate conclusion that Blank’s federal claims are barred by Heck.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting 
the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.   
